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As I put this presentation together, I reflected on the two streams of research that I have 
pursued for the past decade. One is systems analysis which is my current job and the 
other is risk analysis. I serve as director for CREATE, the National Center for Risk and 
Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events at the University of Southern California, the first 
center of excellence funded by the Department of Homeland Security. Of course, Min-
nesota is home to the second center of excellence, the National Center for Food Protection 
and Defense, which is represented here by Director Emeritus Frank Busta. At CREATE, 
our primary focus is on risk analysis applied to terrorism and most of my examples are 
from that area. Since 00, I have been the director also of the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria. There, our tools are forms 
of modeling applied to global problems, including the major theme of water security. 
Other themes are energy, climate change and policy. I will outline systems analysis and 
risk analysis, and provide three examples, and prioritize some terrorism issues.
Systems Analysis
Why systems analysis? Here are quotes by Larry Summers1 from 00 after reading 
 Decision Analysis by Howard Raiffa, IIASA’s first director:
Many children were taught to believe in God, I came to believe in the power of 
systems analysis.
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and from the IIASA Strategic Plan 2011–2020:
Today, policymakers around the globe ask for problem-focused, solution-oriented, 
interdisciplinary research to help them with their complex decisions. They may 
not know it, but they are really asking for systems analysis.
Systems analysis is a group of model-simulation analysis tools—applied mathemat-
ics if you will—specifically applicable to very complex systems that undergo dynamic 
changes and are fraught with uncertainty. A classic example of a problem that lends itself 
to systems analysis is the collapse in the financial system, which indicated many of those 
features and which we are not very good at modeling. Ecosystems are another area where 
we are applying it, energy systems, food production, and so on. All of this is applied 
mathematics, but, more importantly, it is guided by some major overriding factors: the 
analysis should be problem-focused and solution-oriented. You start with the problem. 
You don’t start with a mathematical model and look for a problem, and you look for 
solutions, not necessary optimal solutions but acceptable solutions, and eliminate poor 
solutions. The model is usually developed by a multidisciplinary team taking a holistic 
view of the problem.
Risk Analysis
Why risk analysis? Michael Chertoff  2 has stated the following in several versions:
We have to identify and prioritize risks—understanding the threat, the 
vulnerability and the consequence. And then we have to apply our resources in 
a cost-effective manner.
Frequently, I use that quote to motivate risk analysis. It’s what risk analysis is supposed 
to do, i.e. help decision-makers. It is a combination of risk assessment and management 
that involves identifying the risks, quantifying them—i.e. quantifying the possibilities of 
events that could occur as well as quantifying their consequences—and then looking at 
decision-opportunities, intervention and risk reduction, and evaluating them. The tools 
that we use in risk analysis are on one level just formal expert elicitation of probabilities. 
Often event trees and fault trees, Bayesian networks and influence diagrams are used. The 
combination of systems analysis and risk analysis can move us forward in a qualitative 
step when we need them for problems like systemic risk in the financial sector, ecosystem 
risk, food risk, and so on.
Challenges of Terrorism
Terrorism imposes particular challenges. Terrorists tend to search for high vulnerabilities 
and consequences, unlike technological or natural disasters that occur randomly. They 
observe our defenses and try to attack the weakest remaining links, then change their 
modes and targets of attack. They also try to create events that produce ripple effects 
through instilling fear and eliciting behavior change that can be more damaging than the 
direct results of the event. For example, the direct cost of / was $0 million to $30 
2Second United States secretary of homeland security under Presidents G.W. Bush and Obama.
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billion, including insurance for lives lost, whereas the indirect costs were more like $00 
billion, due to reduction of air-travel, etc.
Several attempts have been made to apply risk analysis to terrorism—probabilistic risk 
analysis, event trees and elicitation of expert probabilities. More recently, decision-tree 
analysis has been employed and game theory—attacker-defender games and experimental 
games—as well as vulnerability and risk-scoring systems.
Lugar Report
Three years ago, Senator Lugar conducted a survey of eighty people, for their opinions 
of the probabilities of a major attack, i.e. nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological, 
somewhere in the world (Figure ).
The median probability of a nuclear or biological attack was judged to be 0% in the 
next 5 years and 0% in the next 0 years, and more so for chemical and radiological 
attacks. I think that these numbers are too high and we can do better. Those surveyed 
were prominent people from Harvard, the CIA, the Senate, the military, etc., but I would 
argue that they weren’t the right people to answer that question. We should be using the 
right experts, asking the right questions and using the right procedures (Figure ).
Bioterrorism Risk Assessment
In an exercise in the context of bioterrorism risk assessment for the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS), we tried to do things better. This was in the context of the DHS 
biannual report to the president, particularly to prioritize biological events and guide 
investments for risk management. CREATE provided help with expert elicitation for 
threat assessment. We began by creating a list of twenty-eight biological agents that were 
prioritized by intelligence analysts and social scientists to provide probability assessments 
of threats and risks, and also of consequences. We helped the development of elicitation 
protocols and gave them tools, and while we didn’t do the actual elicitation—which was 
highly classified—mostly we tried to find elicitators, the people who did the work, and we 
Figure . Lugar report informal expert elicitation.
Survey of probabilities of major attacks.
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provided software support. We also made sure that they were able to quantify uncertain-
ties in their assessments. Most of the intelligence analysts that I have worked with in the 
past say, “It’s probably between 5% and 0%”; so, we helped them to be more specific 
in terms of setting their probability distributions.
Figure . Possible improvements over the Lugar survey.
Figure 3 provides a hypothetical, but relatively realistic, example of a result. Certain 
infectious agents are generally found at the top of such probability assessments. For ex-
ample, this particular operation estimated roughly a 5% chance of an event involving 
Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) in the next 0 years and a 3% chance of an event involving 
Yersinia pestis (bubonic plague), botulinum toxin or ricin occurring in the next 0 years. 
These are cases where there is some bias towards events that have already happened. An 
important aspect is that only four to seven biological agents are deemed most dangerous, 
and many are assigned low probabilities although not necessarily for good reasons. Figure 
4 is an example from the report, unlabelled because the information is classified, showing 
agents of high, medium and low risk. This was used in the first report to the president in 
006 and in the second in 008, and I assume it was in the 00 report, but I was already 
at IIASA then. This provides a reasonable first baseline on risk assessment, but it needs to 
have a closer tie to risk management. We need to figure out how these numbers change with 
interventions and that was not done in the parts that I was involved in, but I understand 
that there is some effort in that direction now. Also, we need to go beyond event trees to 
model complex systems, and we need to consider terrorists’ shifting tactics. 
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Systems with Interdependencies
Los Angeles airport and Long Beach harbor are complex systems that involve people move-
ment and supply chains, and fully protecting them is tricky because necessary resources 
are lacking. So, decisions were needed as to where to place defensive resources. One of 
our ideas that worked well was to use smart randomization. Everything can be protected by 
employing a randomization scheme to protect valuable targets randomly and thus confuse 
terrorists. Accordingly, patrols, inspections and surveillance are randomized. A student of 
ours came up with a wonderful idea to use a Stackelberg game—a business game—also 
called a leader-follower game. He developed a game that involves a defender and an at-
tacker and two assets, asset A and asset B where asset A is more valuable than asset B. If 
only asset A is protected then the attacker will attack asset B because he will know that 
you protect asset A and then you lose and the attacker gains. If the attacker is stupid and 
attacks A while you are protecting A then you win and the attacker loses. In contrast, 
if you protect B the attacker will attack A and not B. To solve this zero-sum game, you 
can randomize between A and B and thereby find a way to get the attacker to achieve 
the minimum expected value. In our analysis, we extended this to non-zero-sum games, 
multiple targets, multiple attackers, with certain real-world constraints—patrol personnel 
have to eat sometime, somewhere—with fast algorithms and real-world implementation. 
Figure 33. Relative probabilities (RP) of selected agents
(given a bioterrorism attack—hypothetical expert).
3Comm = communicable; Non Comm = noncommunicable.
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The assistant for randomized monitoring over routes (ARMOR) project was implemented 
in cooperation with the Los Angeles Police Department which provided inputs into 
ARMOR which were randomized by the game-theory algorithm and the randomized 
schedule was then given back to the police. There was some override capability because 
flexibility is essential, but they never did change it during the first two years of opera-
tion. ARMOR is still being used at the airport and there is statistical evidence that the 
intervention rates a LAX improved substantially after the system was implemented. It is 
now used also by the TSA to randomize the assignment of federal marshals on airplanes, 
and other projects.
Combining Systems for Food Protection
My last example illustrates combining systems and risk analyses for food protection. The 
initial idea was to formulate a model of the food-supply chain and then to superimpose 
a risk model. Although this is an elegant approach, it is also cumbersome. But, once you 
Figure 4. Biological agents (classified) of high, medium and low risk on a relative scale.
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have a model of the food-supply chain, the threats, vulnerabilities and consequences can 
be assessed as can baseline risks. Then protective measures can be identified, including 
optimal sampling procedures, inspections and randomized patrols. Figure 5 shows a rela-
tively simple supply chain, i.e. for milk in Minnesota, starting with the cow and ending in 
the grocery store, and passing through many stages. (On the other hand, the supply chain 
for a hamburger is much more complicated.) There are many storage and testing locations 
and transportation stages, etc., and when they are mapped out a mathematical model of 
the flow may be constructed, and points of vulnerability may be identified (Figure 5).
A terrorist attack would most likely occur close to the end of the supply chain, depend-
ing on the volume of material; the larger the volume the less likely the intervention will be 
detected. With a deterministic model—looking at attack modes, for example introducing 
pathogens, radionuclides or chemicals into the process—come indicators of deaths, both 
acute and delayed, illnesses, and direct and indirect economic costs. This is less of a risk 
analysis, and essentially a systems-analysis model, and an advantage of turning it into 
a computer model is that we can allow the user to adjust the input parameters through 
sliders and scrollbars in Excel.
The next steps with risk analysis are to identify the highest risks and risk-management 
options, assess uncertainty over systems-model parameters—like uncertainty over LD50, 
or uncertainty over mode of attack—then assess probabilities of attacks with and without 
risk management and conduct cost-benefit analysis of risk-management options.
Risk Transfer
The discussion above applies to just one supply chain, raising the issue of the enormity 
of the task of doing this for all supply chains, comprising many kinds of complicated 
food products. Another complication is the problem of risk transfer, because terrorists 
can observe our defenses. On the other hand, if they don’t observe our defenses it may 
be that they should be told, so that they won’t want to go there. But, once they know, 
they will adapt and change modes and attack other targets, so risks will be shifted to 
less-defended parts of the system and the overall risk level may change little. Nuclear 
detection and nuclear defense provide a good example. You can put radionuclide-detec-
tion portals around the United States at main entry points, but terrorists will find holes 
in the system as do smugglers entering the United States from Mexico and Canada. That 
is a significant problem.
Further to risk transfer: within a given system—e.g. a supply chain for a food item—risk 
transfer can by analyzed. Once you have plugged one vulnerability, you can then see how 
the risk shifts to another vulnerability. In theory, you can plug many of them and stop at 
a point where it is no longer cost-effective. Across systems, where there are multiple sup-
ply chains for a food item, it is harder. And for multiple food items and multiple supply 
chains, the task becomes daunting. We need a bottom-up approach, which is the one that 
I just described, in connection with a top-down approach to provide a holistic view of 
the food type and the pathogen or chemical that a terrorist might use. However, working 
both from the bottom and from the top and hopefully finding appropriate linkages will 
be time consuming and involve much effort.
Winterfeldt
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General Insights
The Department of Homeland Security has focused too broadly on too many risks, and 
I similarly fault our own center of excellence. We look at everything, whereas I think it 
would be wise to focus defenses on high-threat, -vulnerability and -consequence scenarios, 
radiological, nuclear and some chemical and biological. For other scenarios, it is useful to 
employ intelligence analysis and police work to intervene early or upstream rather than 
to defend. One of the undersecretaries of homeland security once said:
You are to find the bomber not the bomb.
With food, the objective should be to find risk-management options with large co-benefits 
that pay for themselves. For food defense, you might think in terms of strategies to prevent 
a terrorist tainting something that may be beneficial for other food-safety reasons. Equally, 
solutions that address regular safety issues by introducing new testing and inspection 
procedures may help prevent terrorism. Systems analysis and risk analysis have helped 
in the past, mostly to prevent the government from making stupid decisions, which is 
a worthy achievement. In one case, for example, we helped to avoid the implementa-
tion of laser-based counter-measures to be put on all commercial airplanes to prevent 
surface-to-air missile attacks, which would have cost $30 billion dollars. We were partly 
responsible for that outcome.
The main challenge is how secure is secure enough? Clearly, we will never be com-
pletely safe from terrorism. Nor will we ever have a completely safe food supply. Because 
security measures increase dramatically when we get closer to zero risk, the cost goes 
up tremendously. Perhaps most importantly, increasing security creates other risks and 
inconveniences, and restricts civil liberties. We should always be aware of the need for a 
well balanced system, and avoid over-reacting in terms of security, thus compromising 
other values important to our society.
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